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The following is a summary of a captured Philippine Communist Party document which is undated, but which apparently was written during the period of Communist successes in South Korea. The document was unsigned, but it bore the initials FRM, presumably those of Federico R. Maclean.*

1. According to a Philippine Communist Party document entitled "Additional Political - Military Strategic Conceptions" [REDACTED]

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liberated areas patterned after the technique used by the Communists in China are to be established in the Philippines by Communist forces.

2. This strategy was planned in order to force the Government to concentrate its military forces on holding various cities and communication lines. The Communist plan is to distribute land, to arm the peasants, to establish a local government, and to collect taxes. This policy has a twofold purpose: to win popular allegiance; and to weaken the Government's armed forces, enticing them into combat on unfavorable terms. This is to be the first stage in a nationwide seizure of power.
3. During this phase, the strategic value of Manila in a campaign in Central and Southern Luzon must not be over-emphasized. For this reason, the Party is justified in sending expansion teams to Cagayan, the Ilocos and Bicol areas, and the Visayas.
4. The second and final stage will be the seizure of power on a national scale, in which Manila and Central and Southern Luzon will play decisive roles.

5. The Communists realize that sound planning must assume the possibility of US intervention. According to the document, the Party must make certain that if the US intervenes in the Philippines, it will do so without a justifiable cause acceptable both to the Filipino and the American people.

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This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of Central Intelligence.

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6. The document states that the Party should attack the US politically, but that in military actions care should be taken in order that American lives and property are not touched unless it is necessary and inevitable in the military action against the Philippine Government. It was pointed out that a political victory among the masses must precede a military victory against the Government.
7. The Communist goal in the Philippines is to seize power within two years. However, this date is not regarded as certain. It is not considered difficult to recruit forces numerically superior to those of the Government, but the problem is to train them well enough to engage positions held by forces possessing superior weapons.
8. Since there is no opportunity to train HMB forces to operate heavy weapons,** it is essential that Communist forces infiltrate the Government's heavy weapons crews to persuade them to turn Philippine tanks, aircraft, and artillery against Government forces in the final, critical battle. The document also points out that there is a danger that far-sighted US strategists may replace Filipino heavy weapons personnel with Americans. In this event, the Communists must rely on winning overwhelming mass support and on timing the final offensive for when the US is heavily engaged elsewhere.
9. It was pointed out that the Liberal Party may use the HMB threat as an excuse for suspending the Philippine elections in November 1951. If the elections are held, they undoubtedly will duplicate the fraud and terror practiced in 1949. In either event, the Philippine Communist cause should gain mass sympathy.
10. The Secretariat decision of 14 July 1950 stated that Politburo members will remain in the field until the end of 1950 in order to strengthen the regional commands. Politburo members will then be formed into a military committee to make centralized military preparations. Political directors will retain their present authority until a revolutionary crisis is reached, at which time complete authority will be vested in military commanders. The Central Committee will meet in February 1951, by which time expansion of the regional commands will be well advanced.***
11. Sizeable HMB forces from northern areas of Luzon have been transferred to areas north and east of Manila. Commander Alejandro Viernes**** is now in Manila. His motive has been reported both as a combat mission and as a desire to surrender.
12. A high-ranking Army officer has declared that any raids by HMB forces on the Manila area could be quelled in 30 minutes.

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* Comment. This individual cannot be identified.

25X1A** Comment. the strategy of HMB forces 25X1A on raids in Tarlac Province during late-August 1950 contained a statement by an HMB commander to the effect that the HMB now has artillery pieces which were acquired recently along with supplies of arms and equipment, presumably from a source outside the Philippines.

25X1A*** Comment. Detailed Communist plans presumably are being revised since their compromise as a result of the Government raids. However, it is difficult to believe that this revision could extend to basic strategic concepts. A policy of concentration versus dispersion of top Communist and HMB leaders appears to be a subject of frequent revision.

The long range policy which the document describes would not be inconsistent with continued HMB raids in Central Luzon as a means of keeping the Government and the city of Manila in a chronic state of alarm.

25X1A*** Comment. Alejandro Viernes, who is also known as Colonel Viernes, has been described as one of the slayers of [redacted] in the ambush of April 1949.

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